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INTRODUCTION
This essay explores how institutional capacity limits the Delaware
courts’ role in the U.S. economy. Delaware’s role in advancing important
economic objectives, such as reducing poverty, creating jobs, fostering
innovation, and spurring growth, is a topic of longstanding scholarly and
policy interest. Traditionally, focus has centered on Delaware’s place within
the interstate competition for corporate charters, 1 or Delaware’s position visà-vis the federal government—namely, Congress and the Securities and
Exchange Commission—as the primary regulatory competitor. 2 That
institutional competition is often seen as determining Delaware’s room for
maneuver in the policy landscape, with views differing as to whether the
results benefit or harm the shareholders of U.S. companies.
* Professor of Law, BYU Law School, and Dean and Ira A. Fulton Chair, BYU Law School, respectively.
Authors are listed in alphabetical order. Many thanks to Larry Hamermesh, Mohsen Manesh, and Julian
Velasco for helpful thoughts, comments, and questions on prior drafts. Many thanks to Alex Dolphin for
excellent research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Ofer Eldar & Lorenzo Magnolfi, Regulatory Competition and the Market for
Corporate Law, 12 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 60 (2020); Roberta Romano, The State as a
Laboratory: Legal Innovation and the State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG.
209 (2006).
2. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003).
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Our focus here is different. Rather than looking to institutional
competition to understand the limits of Delaware’s ability to guide corporate
behavior, we study institutional capacity. Traditionally, scholars have
approached corporate law through the lens of Berle’s classic agency cost
paradigm, and Delaware’s capacity to adjudicate the separation of ownership
and control has been largely assumed. But increasing calls to expand
corporate law’s aperture from a narrow occupation with the separation of
ownership and control to a broader concern with stakeholder interests make
questions of capacity more salient. Putting aside the question of the
normative desirability of this broader frame, do the Delaware courts have the
ability to assess third-party interests and protect them when appropriate?
In response, current scholarship offers little more than a gut check.
Implicit in some commentary is the claim that stakeholder interests are a
bridge too far. Others assume that stakeholder interests can be readily fed
into the common law machine just like stockholder interests. We are not
aware, however, of prior work that supplies a systematic explanation for why
either view is correct. 3
We offer here a framework for approaching the institutional capacity
question in corporate law litigation. The framework draws on decision
theory, a way of approaching adjudication that has been applied most
familiarly in the regulatory and antitrust contexts. 4 Perhaps more than
anything else, this approach highlights the challenges of decision-making
under conditions of uncertainty. Expanding or altering the agency cost
paradigm to include protections for stakeholder interests risks clouding the
lens that the Delaware courts have used to navigate uncertainty for some
time. We do not offer this claim, preliminary as it is, solely in the spirit of
skepticism, dismissive of innovative policy proposals for addressing
pressing social problems. Rather, we hope to focus attention on the
institutional capacity question that underlies the ongoing substantive debate.
Solutions for expanding institutional capacity in step with a broader remit
for corporate law may exist, but they must be surfaced, debated, and refined.
In short, if wider stakeholder interests are to be included within corporate
law, it is time to get serious about judicial infrastructure.

3. Perhaps the prior work closest to this essay is Stephen M. Bainbridge, Don’t Compound the
Caremark Mistake by Extending It to ESG Oversight, THE BUSINESS LAWYER (Sept. 2021), though our
explicit focus here on institutional capacity is different.
4. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984); C. Frederick
Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999);
Steven C. Salop, The Evolution and Vitality of Merger Presumptions: A Decision-Theoretic Approach,
80 ANTITRUST L.J. 269 (2015).
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The Delaware Courts Amidst Vibrant Private Ordering
We begin with the observation that corporate law disputes arise within
an economic environment characterized by vibrant private ordering. It is
often said that the Delaware General Corporation Law enables such private
ordering, overseen by an equitable overlay supplied by the Delaware courts.5
Companies are free to innovate new governance arrangements, and they do
so with gusto—from exotic forms of dual class stock to arsenals of takeover
defenses to thickets of different M&A structures and terms. 6 As a result, the
governance of the modern corporation is both heterogeneous and dynamic.
Such legal innovations may not be unalloyed goods, but rather may
pose important costs on the corporation and its constituencies. For instance,
a defensive measure may go beyond simply protecting a company from an
opportunistic raider to entrenching an underperforming board. In the
litigation that often arises from the development of a new legal innovation,
the trick for the court is understanding what the effects of the new device are
for the parties to the dispute and, importantly, for the market more broadly. 7
In short, the court must make a decision under conditions of uncertainty.
Judicial Limitations Under Conditions of Uncertainty
The basic elements of decision theory provide a useful way to approach
the court’s task in this setting. 8 A decision theoretic approach to the judicial
enterprise is, of course, a functional simplification of many aspects of
adjudication—the path dependency of precedent falls from view, for
instance. So, we do not offer this approach as a comprehensive framework
for understanding how Delaware courts reach their conclusions. Rather,
decision theory highlights the important issue that uncertainty presents in
5. Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action Is Lawful, Presumably There Are Circumstances in Which
It Is Equitable to Take That Action: The Implicit Corollary to the Rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 BUS.
LAW. 877, 882 (2005) (noting that “equitable principles of fiduciary duty would be an overlay to and a
constraint on the statutory powers of directors was not innovative, it was part of the longstanding
operation of our law”).
6. For recent analyses of legal innovation in the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) market, which
is an arena of primary concern in U.S. corporate governance, see Matthew Jennejohn, Julian Nyarko &
Eric Talley, Contractual Evolution, 89 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (2022); Guhan Subramanian & Caley
Patrucci, Deals in the Time of Pandemic, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1405 (2021).
7. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of Corporations,
27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499 (2002).
8. For work in the antitrust context that uses decision theory to similar effect, see David S. Evans
& A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago
Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (2005); Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A
Decision-Theoretic Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469 (2001) (applying the decision theory framework
to tying and technological innovation).
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corporate law litigation.
Where outcomes are uncertain, decision theory posits that optimization
is possible by first calculating (1) the benefits of correct decisions, (2) the
costs of incorrect decisions, and (3) the probabilities of those benefits and
costs being realized. 9 One then combines those cost and benefit calculations,
weighted by the probabilities of their occurrence, to calculate net expected
values for each available choice. The decision with the greatest expected
value—i.e., the choice whose likely outcomes result in the greatest net
benefit—is then the option that should be pursued.
Of course, at times, calculating that expected value is easier said than
done. A useful way to think of the challenges that a court may have in
calculating the probable effects of its decisions may be Frank Knight’s
classic differentiation between “uncertainty” on one hand and “risk” on the
other. 10
In common parlance, risk arises from any uncertainty about the future,
but Knight distinguishes situations in which the distribution of potential
outcomes is quantifiable (“risk”) from situations in which the distribution of
potential outcomes is unquantifiable “because the situation dealt with is in a
high degree unique” (“uncertainty”). 11 In other words, “risk” is predictable,
and “uncertainty” is not.
Knight pins the hope of eventually transitioning from uncertainty to risk
on repeated experimentation. It is the chance to “secur[e] the same degree
of homogeneity in the instances classed together” that allows the decisionmaker to discern patterns and, eventually, probabilities. 12 It is that proclivity
for initiating and navigating that experimental process that sets the
entrepreneur apart and allows them to convert a landscape fraught with
uncertainty into risk.
Implicit in Knight’s perspective is a stable model—or heuristic—that
the decision-maker can use to compare the events that are emerging through
that experimental process. 13 One must have a theory with which to interpret
the events unfolding in the landscape. Without such a lens, it becomes
impossible to perceive emerging trends, which appear only as a stream of
uninterpretable novelty.
Of course, even with a stable model with which to approach the

9. For classic introductions, see generally JAMES O. BERGER, STATISTICAL DECISION THEORY AND
BAYESIAN ANALYSIS (1985); HOWARD RAIFFA & ROBERT SCHLAIFER, APPLIED STATISTICAL DECISION
THEORY (1961).
10. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 214 (1921) (differentiating between
risk and uncertainty).
11. Id. at 229.
12. Id. at 216.
13. Id.
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strategic environment, decision-making can still be challenging, though
perhaps for more mundane reasons. Even in a decision landscape
characterized by risk, rather than uncertainty, it is possible for the sheer
volume and velocity of information to overwhelm a decision-maker. 14
Writing in the administrative law context, and borrowing a concept from
Clay Shirky, Wendy Wagner defines “filter failure” as agencies’ inability to
process the vast amount of information developed in the regulatory process. 15
While Wagner focuses on the role “filter failure” plays in agency capture,16
it is the predicate condition for that capture—the barrage of information that
overwhelms agency information processing capacity—which is relevant
here.
The filter failure issue is mundane only in the sense that it typically can
be addressed through adequate resourcing. A fully supported court with its
staff and infrastructural needs met should be able to process the information
load it is asked to bear. With respect to policy salience, however, the filter
failure issue is not mundane at all. The U.S. judiciary regularly encounters
periods of under-funding, and courts’ simple ability to parse the information
presented to them in litigation cannot be taken for granted. 17
In a non-trivial class of situations, these two types of problems—model
uncertainty and filter failure—can combine in a perfect storm of sorts.
Courts may be unmoored from conceptual foundations and out to sea in an
ocean of complex, often conflicting data. As will be discussed in Part III
below, this may not mean that judicial decision-making is irretrievably
dysfunctional. Rather, the point is more subtle. Making effective decisions
in such an uncertain environment may require a different institutional logic
and design than what has prevailed in Delaware for decades.
The Stable Model of Late 20th Century Corporate Law
Courts adjudicating corporate governance disputes within that
tumultuous environment apply a standard model—or theory of how the
14. Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J.
1321, 1325 (2010).
15. See id. (defining filter failure).
16. Id. at 1325. Wagner argues that filter failure causes “information capture,” a specific type of
agency capture. The main distinction between information capture and other forms of agency capture is
that it affects agencies across the board, including those that diligently try not to be overly responsive to
regulated industries. Id. at 1326.
17. Measures taken by state bar associations to shore up dramatically reduced budgets during the
2008 financial crisis and its aftermath provides an example of the issue. See Robert J. Derocher, Crisis
in the Courts: Bars Take Steps to Stave Off Judicial Funding Cuts, 34 BAR LEADER (May-June 2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/bar_services/publications/bar_leader/2009_10/may_june/courtcrisi
s/ [https://perma.cc/9UA6-ULDA].
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market operates—to understand how new forms of private ordering affect
the interests of litigating parties. That model is the agency cost paradigm
that is, as noted above, rooted in Berle’s classic work. 18 The agency cost
paradigm is the lens through which disputes are viewed, and, while the
particular subjects and landscapes within the frame change from lawsuit to
lawsuit, the lens itself is more or less stable. That stability allows the court,
and, more broadly, the actors and advisers in the corporate governance
ecosystem, to parse the information presented in litigation.
The central focus of the agency cost paradigm is the conflict created
when one person acts on behalf of another. In the context of corporate law,
the directors are viewed as agents of the shareholders, who are conceived as
principals. For many, the function of corporate law is to minimize the total
agency costs inherent in the relationship between directors and shareholders.
One mechanism for reducing these agency costs is corporate fiduciary law,
which demands that directors act in alignment with the interests of
shareholders.
The Delaware courts present corporate fiduciary law with admirable
simplicity: directors and officers owe duties of care and loyalty, and,
depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, the courts apply one
of three standards to evaluate compliance with these duties: the business
judgment rule, enhanced scrutiny, and entire fairness. 19 The business
judgment rule protects corporate directors from liability for honest mistakes
in cases where the directors actually made a business decision,20 the directors
inquired into, were reasonably informed about, and deliberated on their
decision, 21 the directors were disinterested with regard to the decision, 22 and
in making the decision, the directors were unbiased and motivated by the
18. See generally ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
19. The Delaware courts describe the duties of care and loyalty as the “standard(s) of conduct”
(“what directors are expected to do”) and the business judgment rule, enhanced scrutiny, and entire
fairness as the “standard of review” (“the test that a court applies when evaluating whether directors have
met the standard of conduct”). In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig. (Trados II), 73 A.3d 17, 35–36 (Del. Ch.
2013).
20. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984) (stating that the business judgment
rule “has no role where directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious decision,
failed to act”).
21. See, e.g., Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 737 (1960) (“If the question of value, which was the
issue to be determined on remand, fell under the developed facts into a field in which reasonable men,
fully informed, could well differ in opinion, then the sound business judgment rule required the court to
approve the plan.”).
22. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816 (“The requirement of director independence inhers in the
conception and rationale of the business judgment rule.”); Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6-7 (Sup. Ct.
1944) (noting that the business judgment rule “yields to the rule of undivided loyalty,” so that “personal
transactions of directors with their corporations . . . as may tend to produce a conflict between self-interest
and fiduciary obligation, are, when challenged, examined with the most scrupulous care”).
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welfare of the corporation. If a shareholder plaintiff “rebuts” the business
judgment rule by proving a breach of the duty of care or proving that the
directors acted in self-interest, the burden shifts to the defendant directors to
prove the “entire fairness” of the transaction. The business judgment rule is
the most deferential standard for directors, and the entire fairness standard is
the most demanding. “Enhanced scrutiny” occupies a middle ground—it is
more searching than the business judgment rule and less demanding than
entire fairness—in cases where directors face an inherent conflict of interest,
such as when directors institute defensive tactics that prevent shareholders
from responding to a hostile takeover.
Even a cursory reading of judicial opinions from Delaware reveals,
however, that this simple framing obscures a great deal of nuance in
fiduciary regulation. For example, the Delaware courts often refer to special
duties that derive from the general obligations of care and loyalty, such as
duties of disclosure or candor, 23 oversight, 24 and good faith, 25 as well as
actions for waste, 26 gift, 27 and usurpation of corporate opportunity. 28 Thus,
the landscape of fiduciary law in Delaware is much more complicated than
the simple frame implies.
In summary, Delaware corporate law might be considered a more or
less coherent system that encompass a variety of subsystems—i.e., discrete
doctrines—developed over the years to classify and police agency costs,
which come in a number of flavors. 29 This internal complexity provides the

23. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998) (“The duty of directors to observe
proper disclosure requirements derives from the combination of the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and
good faith.”).
24. See, e.g., Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006)
(describing the “the necessary conditions predicate for director oversight liability”).
25. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66-67 (Del. 2006) (describing
“intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities” as “a legally appropriate,
although not the exclusive, definition of fiduciary bad faith”).
26. See, e.g., Saxe v. Brady, Del. Ch., 184 A.2d 602, 610 (1962) (“[W]hether what the corporation
has received is so inadequate in value that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would deem
it worth what the corporation has paid.”).
27. See, e.g., Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 217 (Del. 1979) (“The essence of a claim of gift
is lack of consideration”).
28. See, e.g., Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154-55 (Del. 1996) (“The corporate
opportunity doctrine, as delineated by Guth and its progeny, holds that a corporate officer or director may
not take a business opportunity for his own if: (1) the corporation is financially able to exploit the
opportunity; (2) the opportunity is within the corporation’s line of business; (3) the corporation has an
interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and (4) by taking the opportunity for his own, the corporate
fiduciary will thereby be placed in a position inimicable to his duties to the corporation.”).
29. The systemic property of modern corporate governance is thoughtfully captured in Dorothy S.
Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The Corporate Governance Machine, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 2563 (2021)
(providing a systemic account that looks across a broad range of public and private institutions, and not
only U.S. state fiduciary law).
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courts with ready options for analyzing new privately ordered innovations
that the market produces.
Perhaps an extension of the lens metaphor might clarify the relationship
between the system and its constituent parts. At times, the flood of novel
information presented to the court in litigation may be like too much light
coming through the aperture or motion too swift to be captured with accuracy
in a frame. In photography, however, the solution to such issues is not to
discard the lens entirely but rather to more finely calibrate the instrument—
to, for instance, change the focal length of the lens by selecting a new f-stop.
The doctrinal richness of Delaware’s jurisprudence provides such
opportunity for calibration without abandoning the lens altogether. Thus, the
standard model is not static—doctrines adjust to contend with new
developments, like a photographer fiddling with lens settings—while the
essential contours of the framework remain consistent.
The Consistency of Caremark
The so-called Caremark doctrine occupies a small but conceptually
important space within Delaware corporate fiduciary law. It represents a
“class of cases in which director liability for inattention is theoretically
possible [because] a loss eventuates not from a decision but, from
unconsidered inaction.” 30 Chancellor Allen, author of the Caremark
decision, suggested that this sort of claim is “possibly the most difficult
theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a
judgment.” 31
Although the original decision rested on the notion of “unconsidered
inaction” and made several references to the duty of care, Chancellor Strine
subsequently reasoned that “the opinion articulates a standard for liability
for failures of oversight that requires a showing that the directors breached
their duty of loyalty by failing to attend to their duties in good faith.” 32 The
Delaware Supreme Court followed Chancellor Strine’s lead in Stone v.
Ritter, holding that directors would be liable for breach of the duty of loyalty
when “the directors [completely] fail[] to implement any reporting or
information system or controls or . . . having implemented such a system or
controls, consciously fail[] to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling
themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their
attention.” 33 In a recent decision, Chief Justice Strine offers a succinct
summary of the Caremark doctrine: “If Caremark means anything, it is that
30.
31.
32.
33.

In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003).
Stone, 911 A.2d at 372 (Del. 2006).
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a corporate board must make a good faith effort to exercise its duty of care.
A failure to make that effort constitutes a breach of the duty of loyalty.” 34
The Caremark doctrine at first glance seems to invite a court to
undertake a particularly far-ranging inquiry, but it enjoys the same stability
as the standard model. In a Caremark inquiry, the Delaware courts have
distinguished between “the board’s oversight of the company’s management
of business risk that is inherent in its business plan from the board’s oversight
of the company’s compliance with positive law—including regulatory
mandates.” 35 While liability could theoretically flow from a lack of
oversight in either context, “[f]ailure to monitor compliance with positive
law, including regulatory mandates, is more likely to give rise to oversight
liability.” 36 Thus, when Delaware courts evaluate a board’s alleged breach
of fiduciary duty under Caremark, they are usually outsourcing the question
of third-party harm to another institution. Questions of whether, for instance,
antitrust violations or fraud were committed at a company are addressed
through different lenses, which are often in the hands of entirely different
operators, such as an executive branch agency. The subsidiary analysis of
whether a board breached its oversight duties, a question that falls within the
standard agency cost framework, piggybacks on the regulatory state. To
extend the running analogy even further, it is like two photographers working
in tandem at a shoot. That division of labor, if imperfect at times, preserves
the essential integrity of the agency cost framework when applied in the
oversight context.
The EESG Frontier
How does expanding fiduciary duties to include expanded third-party
interests affect the standard model on which the Delaware courts have relied
to parse an uncertain environment? Of course, a key part to answering that
question is the magnitude of any proposed departure from the agency cost
framework. Here, we simply note that proposals vary, with some situating
employee, environmental, social and governance (EESG) concerns within
Caremark in a way that is largely consistent with its traditional application,
and others that outline more ambitious proposals for including stakeholder
interests within the fiduciary duties of corporate boards. 37 It is the latter,
34.
35.
36.
37.

Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019).
In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 WL 4850188, at *10 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019).
In re Facebook, Inc. Sec. 220 Litig., 2019 WL 2320842, at *14 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2019).
Compare, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Kirby M. Smith & Reilly S. Steel, Caremark and ESG, Perfect
Together: A Practical Approach to Implementing an Integrated, Efficient, and Effective Caremark and
EESG Strategy, 106 IOWA L. REV. 1885, 1896-97 (2021) (arguing that “new” EESG concerns fit within
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more ambitious, projects that extend the consideration of stakeholder
interests beyond the simple lawful operation of the corporation to broader
notions of prudence or morality that interest us here. Those proposals relax
the standard assumption that the predicate question of whether the
corporation has engaged in wrongful behavior affecting third-party
stakeholders is typically not decided by the Delaware courts, but rather by
other institutions.
In an ambitious expansion of Caremark (or other doctrine within the
fiduciary duty toolkit), stockholder and stakeholder interests are now
wrapped into a single inquiry, which no longer takes its cues from the
regulatory state. Here, the problem is not simply the quantity or speed of the
information that the court must parse (which will, of course, be significant
in this setting). Rather, the issue akin to what Daniel Farber refers to as
“model uncertainty”—i.e., a basic ambiguity about which model, or theory,
should be applied in a particular regulatory setting. 38 In short, the court no
longer has a stable guide with which to understand the market.
A court experiencing model uncertainty is relatively unmoored and
decision-making becomes, by necessity, more experimental. The court is no
longer making modest doctrinal adjustments to square new market
development with them; rather, the court becomes deeply engaged with the
process of articulating the new paradigm itself. This mode of adjudication
is not unfamiliar to either the U.S. judiciary’s or even Delaware’s
experience. 39 Nevertheless, it comes with a significant potential tradeoff, to
the extent that refashioning the Delaware courts’ fundamental model
interferes with their ability to swiftly and accurately process information in
the courts’ traditional realm. That is, heightened model uncertainty may well
increase the likelihood of filter failure. Were the Delaware courts a sleepy
backwater, the potential costs of such a tradeoff might be minimal. But the
Delaware courts are no such thing, and interfering with the normal operation
of the system poses real and significant possible downsides.
Taking Experimentation Seriously
Model uncertainty introduces a critical limit to the Delaware courts’

the traditional Caremark analysis), with Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social
Risk, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1458-71 (2020) (arguing for an expanded purview for Caremark that
considers stakeholder interests to an extent beyond the current regime).
38. Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901 (2010).
39. For instance, Delaware corporate law was in significant extent transformed in the last third of
the 20th century, with Chancellor Allen’s influential tenure a useful marker of the phenomenon. Epochal
legal change is no stranger to Delaware. The point we make here, however, is that sea changes should
not be taken for granted, and some effort in managing them is well spent.
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role in U.S. corporate governance. Delaware’s primacy arises, in part, from
a stable analytical lens, around which the courts have built their expertise
and a broader ecosystem has coalesced. 40 Destabilizing that lens risks the
regular operation of the system. Calls to depart from the stable framework
must, at least, explain and prescribe how the system can adjust effectively.
The challenge, while daunting, is not insurmountable. We note that
experimentalist forms of adjudication have been deployed to navigate model
uncertainty in a variety of other settings, both public and private, in the
Purpose-built for high uncertainty
United States and elsewhere. 41
environments, experimentalist institutions embrace a pragmatic, iterative
analytical process that gathers information, designs prototypes, and revises
based on ongoing learning with stakeholders. 42 Perhaps such an approach to
corporate law litigation would allow the Delaware courts to navigate the
process of reconstituting its analytical lens to include stakeholder interests
within its remit, eventually producing a new coherent vision.
Whether experimentalism is the right road for Delaware to take and
what would be required to implement it are large questions. To the extent
stakeholder interests are normatively desirable in corporate law, we think
exploring those questions further is worthwhile. In short, while substantive
questions might lead the discussion, questions regarding institutional
infrastructure should not be far behind.
CONCLUSION
Fiduciary law is an elegant check on corporate decision-making tailored
40. In an especially thoughtful analysis of Delaware’s success, the eminent litigator, William Savitt,
notes that a key factor is the social network of expert lawyers that have clustered around the Court of
Chancery. William Savitt, The Genius of the Modern Chancery System, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 570,
573 (2012).
41. For a definitive treatment of experimentalism in legal institutions, focused on constitutional law,
see Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 267 (1998). For other applications in a variety of legal contexts, see Charles F. Sabel & William H.
Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004);
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65 (2015); Tim Wu, Intellectual
Property Experimentalism by Way of Competition Law, 9 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 30 (2013); Ronald
J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal
Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010). This literature’s
origins are found in Sabel’s pioneering work on economic organization. See generally MICHAEL PIORE
& CHARLES SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY (1984); Charles
F. Sabel, Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a Volatile Economy, 46 HUM. RELS. 1133
(1993); Charles F. Sabel, Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development, in THE
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 835 (1994).
42. Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 446 (2009); Matthew C.
Jennejohn, Collaboration, Innovation, and Contract Design, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 83 (2008).
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to ensure that the directors and officers who exercise discretion over a
corporation’s resources do not act opportunistically. 43 By expanding the
remit of the Delaware courts from this focus on opportunism to broader
notions of prudence or morality, proposals to consider EESG under the
Caremark framework or other fiduciary doctrines invite consideration of
institutional capacity: do the Delaware courts have the ability to assess thirdparty interests and protect them when appropriate? In this essay, we express
concern over the “model uncertainty” that inevitably would follow from such
a shift in the courts’ focus.
Overall, our theme evokes the jurist, Leo E. Strine, Jr., to whom this
symposium issue is dedicated. At once, we highlight the analytical prowess
of the Delaware courts, to which Vice Chancellor, Chancellor, and finally
Chief Justice Strine contributed with such well-deserved acclaim. At the
same time, we also identify a fundamental limit to the Delaware courts’
reach, which recalls the circumspect wisdom we have encountered when
interacting with the former Chief Justice. We hope that combination will
continue to serve the Delaware courts and, by extension, the constituents of
U.S. companies well into the future.

43. D. Gordon Smith, “Firms and Fiduciaries,” in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 293
(Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, eds., 2016).

